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community
godot
Commits
640169da
Unverified
Commit
640169da
authored
Mar 09, 2020
by
Rémi Verschelde
Committed by
GitHub
Mar 09, 2020
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Merge pull request #36943 from akien-mga/mbedtls-reapply-pr1453
mbedtls: Re-apply upstream PR 1453 after #36823
parents
65e0a2fb
9a727714
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2 changed files
with
52 additions
and
9 deletions
+52
-9
entropy_poll.c
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
+22
-7
x509_crt.c
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
+30
-2
No files found.
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
View file @
640169da
...
...
@@ -61,28 +61,43 @@
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#endif
#include <windows.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <bcrypt.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
* <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
* These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
* warning when including intsafe.h.
*/
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
#endif
#include <intsafe.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
int
mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll
(
void
*
data
,
unsigned
char
*
output
,
size_t
len
,
size_t
*
olen
)
{
HCRYPTPROV
provider
;
ULONG
len_as_ulong
=
0
;
((
void
)
data
);
*
olen
=
0
;
if
(
CryptAcquireContext
(
&
provider
,
NULL
,
NULL
,
PROV_RSA_FULL
,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT
)
==
FALSE
)
/*
* BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
* 64-bit Windows platforms. Ensure len's value can be safely converted into
* a ULONG.
*/
if
(
FAILED
(
SizeTToULong
(
len
,
&
len_as_ulong
)
)
)
{
return
(
MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
);
}
if
(
CryptGenRandom
(
provider
,
(
DWORD
)
len
,
output
)
==
FALSE
)
if
(
!
BCRYPT_SUCCESS
(
BCryptGenRandom
(
NULL
,
output
,
len_as_ulong
,
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG
)
)
)
{
CryptReleaseContext
(
provider
,
0
);
return
(
MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
);
}
CryptReleaseContext
(
provider
,
0
);
*
olen
=
len
;
return
(
0
);
...
...
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c
View file @
640169da
...
...
@@ -65,6 +65,19 @@
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
/* Visual Studio 2010 and earlier issue a warning when both <stdint.h> and
* <intsafe.h> are included, as they redefine a number of <TYPE>_MAX constants.
* These constants are guaranteed to be the same, though, so we suppress the
* warning when including intsafe.h.
*/
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4005 )
#endif
#include <intsafe.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1600
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
#else
#include <time.h>
#endif
...
...
@@ -1277,6 +1290,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
char
filename
[
MAX_PATH
];
char
*
p
;
size_t
len
=
strlen
(
path
);
int
lengthAsInt
=
0
;
WIN32_FIND_DATAW
file_data
;
HANDLE
hFind
;
...
...
@@ -1291,7 +1305,18 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
p
=
filename
+
len
;
filename
[
len
++
]
=
'*'
;
w_ret
=
MultiByteToWideChar
(
CP_ACP
,
0
,
filename
,
(
int
)
len
,
szDir
,
if
(
FAILED
(
SizeTToInt
(
len
,
&
lengthAsInt
)
)
)
return
(
MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
);
/*
* Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP, and assumes the incoming
* string is encoded in ANSI, before translating it into Unicode. If the
* incoming string were changed to be UTF-8, then the length check needs to
* change to check the number of characters, not the number of bytes, in the
* incoming string are less than MAX_PATH to avoid a buffer overrun with
* MultiByteToWideChar().
*/
w_ret
=
MultiByteToWideChar
(
CP_ACP
,
0
,
filename
,
lengthAsInt
,
szDir
,
MAX_PATH
-
3
);
if
(
w_ret
==
0
)
return
(
MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA
);
...
...
@@ -1308,8 +1333,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
if
(
file_data
.
dwFileAttributes
&
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY
)
continue
;
if
(
FAILED
(
SizeTToInt
(
wcslen
(
file_data
.
cFileName
),
&
lengthAsInt
)
)
)
return
(
MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR
);
w_ret
=
WideCharToMultiByte
(
CP_ACP
,
0
,
file_data
.
cFileName
,
l
strlenW
(
file_data
.
cFileName
)
,
l
engthAsInt
,
p
,
(
int
)
len
-
1
,
NULL
,
NULL
);
if
(
w_ret
==
0
)
...
...
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